• Corpus ID: 235358759

Extending counterfactual accounts of intent to include oblique intent

@article{Ashton2021ExtendingCA,
  title={Extending counterfactual accounts of intent to include oblique intent},
  author={Hal Ashton},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2021},
  volume={abs/2106.03684}
}
One approach to defining Intention is to use the counterfactual tools developed to define Causality. Direct Intention is considered the highest level of intent in the common law, and is a sufficient component for the most serious crimes to be committed. Loosely defined it is the commission of actions to bring about a desired or targeted outcome. Direct Intention is not always necessary for the most serious category of crimes because society has also found it necessary to develop a theory of… 

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