Extended emotion

  title={Extended emotion},
  author={J. Adam Carter and Emma C. Gordon and Spyridon Orestis Palermos},
  journal={Philosophical Psychology},
  pages={198 - 217}
Recent thinking within philosophy of mind about the ways cognition can extend (e.g., Clark, 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Menary, 2006; Wilson, 2000, 2004) has yet to be integrated with philosophical theories of emotion, which give cognition a central role. We carve out new ground at the intersection of these areas and, in doing so, defend what we call the extended emotion thesis: the claim that some emotions can extend beyond skin and skull to parts of the external world. 
Extended Emotions
Until recently, philosophers and psychologists conceived of emotions as brainand body-bound affairs. But researchers have started to challenge this internalist and individualist orthodoxy. A rapidlyExpand
Editorial: Affectivity Beyond the Skin
A growing number of researchers in cognitive science challenge the idea that the authors can understand the mind by just looking at the brain, arguing that their psychological capacities are realized not just by their brain but also their bodies, as well as the complex ways these bodies interact with their material and social environments. Expand
Emotional sharing and the extended mind
The proposal that a construal of socially extended emotions in terms of a constitutive integration of the participating individuals’ experiences is more promising than proposals that simply appeal to various forms of social situatedness, embeddedness, or scaffolding is proposed. Expand
What is ‘mental action’?
  • Y. Levy
  • Psychology
  • Philosophical Psychology
  • 2019
ABSTRACT There has been a resurgence of interest lately within the philosophy of mind and action in the category of mental action. Against this background, the present paper aims to question the veryExpand
Varieties of the extended self
It is demonstrated that the boundaries of selves are fluid, shifting across biological, artifactual, and sociocultural structures, and the notions of minimal self, person, and narrative self are distinguished. Expand
Extended Affectivity as the Cognition of Primary Intersubjectivity
I discuss the primordial affectivity approach (Colombetti 2014) and the extended emotions theory (Krueger 2014, Slaby 2014, Candiotto 2015, Carter et al. 2016) in order to propose a novel account ofExpand
The Affectively Extended Self
In this paper we suggest an understanding of the self within the conceptual framework of situated affectivity, proposing the notion of an affectively extended self and arguing that the construction,Expand
Schizophrenia and the Scaffolded Self
A family of recent externalist approaches in philosophy of mind argues that our psychological capacities are synchronically and diachronically “scaffolded” by external (i.e., beyond-the-brain)Expand
Extended cognition
Extended cognition takes the idea that your mind is ‘on’ your smartphone literally. It says that human cognitive states and processes sometimes spill outside our heads and into objects in ourExpand
Epistemic Luck and the Extended Mind
  • J. Carter
  • Psychology
  • The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck
  • 2019
Contemporary debates about epistemic luck and its relation to knowledge have traditionally proceeded against a tacit background commitment to cognitive internalism, the thesis that cognitiveExpand


Emotions beyond brain and body
The emerging consensus in the philosophy of cognition is that cognition is situated, i.e., dependent upon or co-constituted by the body, the environment, and/or the embodied interaction with it. ButExpand
Embodying Emotion
Recent findings provide a scientific account of the familiar contention that “when you're smiling, the whole world smiles with you”. Expand
The Extended Mind
Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the intuitive demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body isExpand
The Relationship of Emotion to Cognition: A Functional Approach to a Semantic Controversy
Abstract We first review the main points in the dispute about whether emotion is primary and independent of cognition (Zajonc), or secondary and always dependent upon cognition (Lazarus), and suggestExpand
Making it mental: in search for the golden mean of the extended cognition controversy
This paper engages the extended cognition controversy by advancing a theory which fits nicely into an attractive and surprisingly unoccupied conceptual niche situated comfortably between traditionalExpand
Contemporary analytic philosophy of emotions is currently dominated by two seemingly opposing camps.1 In one camp we have those generally labelled cognitivists and in the other those who favour aExpand
Cognition and motivation in emotion.
The role of cognition--and to some extent motivation--in emotion, the ways meaning is generated, unconscious appraising, and the implications of this way of thinking for life-span development areExpand
Individualism and psychology
Recent years have seen in psychology — and overlapping parts of linguistics, artificial intelligence, and the social sciences — the development of some semblance of agreement about an approach to theExpand
Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences - Cognition
Part I. Disciplining the Individual and the Mind: 1. The individual in the fragile sciences 2. Individuals, psychology and the mind 3. Nativism on my mind Part II. Individualism and Externalism inExpand
Radical Embodied Cognitive Science
While philosophers of mind have been arguing over the status of mental representations in cognitive science, cognitive scientists have been quietly engaged in studying perception, action, andExpand