Extended Modal Dimensionalism

  title={Extended Modal Dimensionalism},
  author={Martin Vacek},
  journal={Acta Analytica},
  • Martin Vacek
  • Published 1 March 2017
  • Philosophy, Sociology
  • Acta Analytica
Modal dimensionalism (MD) is realism about spaces, times and worlds—metaphysical indices that make objects spatial, temporal and modal, respectively, and that play the role of alethic relativizers, i.e. items to which matters of truth are relativized. This paper examines several arguments against MD and shows that MD offers a feasible way to understand modal discourse. 
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