• Corpus ID: 195446938

Extended Functionalism from a Behavioral Perspective

  title={Extended Functionalism from a Behavioral Perspective},
  author={Filipe Lazzeri},
Mental (or psychological) phenomena (those we refer to by means of terms from so-called folk psychology; e.g., intentions, fears, reasoning processes) are often thought of as confined to the insides of the body. The extended mind view, like behavioral approaches, challenges this assumption, by claiming that some mental phenomena comprise external ingredients. Yet, unlike behavioral approaches, the extended mind view (e.g., as in Clark & Chalmers’ seminal paper) holds that these phenomena often… 
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