Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes

@article{Ferraz2005ExposingCP,
  title={Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes},
  author={Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Shimizu Finan},
  journal={Latin American Economics},
  year={2005}
}
  • C. FerrazF. Finan
  • Published 16 November 2005
  • Political Science, Economics
  • Latin American Economics
This paper examines the extent to which access to information enhances political accountability. Based upon the results of Brazil’s recent anti-corruption program that randomly audits municipal expenditures of federally-transferred funds, it estimates the effect of the disclosure of local government corruption practices upon the re-election success of incumbent mayors in municipal elections. Comparing municipalities which were randomly audited before the elections with those audited after, the… 

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