Exploring the Resilience of Some Lightweight Ciphers Against Profiled Single Trace Attacks

  title={Exploring the Resilience of Some Lightweight Ciphers Against Profiled Single Trace Attacks},
  author={Valentina Banciu and Elisabeth Oswald and Carolyn Whitnall},
This paper compares attack outcomes w.r.t. profiled single trace attacks of four different lightweight ciphers in order to investigate which of their properties, if any, contribute to attack success. We show that mainly the diffusion properties of both the round function and the key schedule play a role. In particular, the more reasonably statistically independent intermediate values are produced in a target implementation, the better attacks succeed. A crucial aspect for lightweight ciphers is… 
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