Exploring the Bargaining Model of War

  title={Exploring the Bargaining Model of War},
  author={Dan Reiter},
  journal={Perspectives on Politics},
  pages={27 - 43}
  • Dan Reiter
  • Published 1 March 2003
  • Economics
  • Perspectives on Politics
The bargaining model of war envisions the initiation, prosecution, termination, and consequences of war as part of a single bargaining process. This article focuses on the most recent works on this topic, many of which employ formal techniques, and it applies the model to the different phases of war. It also discusses the state of empirical work on the bargaining model. Finally, the article considers how the bargaining model meshes with other theories of war and international relations… 
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