Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-engineering

  title={Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-engineering},
  author={G. Brun},
  • G. Brun
  • Published 2016
  • Mathematics
  • Erkenntnis
Taking Carnap’s classic exposition as a starting point, this paper develops a pragmatic account of the method of explication, defends it against a range of challenges and proposes a detailed recipe for the practice of explicating. It is then argued that confusions are involved in characterizing explications as definitions, and in advocating precising definitions as an alternative to explications. Explication is better characterized as conceptual re-engineering for theoretical purposes, in… Expand

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