Explication Defended

  title={Explication Defended},
  author={Patrick Maher},
  journal={Studia Logica},
  • P. Maher
  • Published 1 July 2007
  • Philosophy, Computer Science
  • Studia Logica
How can formal methods be applied to philosophical problems that involve informal concepts of ordinary language? Carnap answered this question by describing a methodology that he called “explication." Strawson objected that explication changes the subject and does not address the original philosophical problem; this paper shows that Carnap’s response to that objection was inadequate and offers a better response. More recent criticisms of explication by Boniolo and Eagle are shown to rest on… Expand

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