Explanation, imagination, and confidence in judgment.

  title={Explanation, imagination, and confidence in judgment.},
  author={Derek J. Koehler},
  journal={Psychological bulletin},
  volume={110 3},
  • D. Koehler
  • Published 1 November 1991
  • Psychology
  • Psychological bulletin
This article concerns a class of experimental manipulations that require people to generate explanations or imagine scenarios. A review of studies using such manipulations indicates that people who explain or imagine a possibility then express greater confidence in the truth of that possibility. It is argued that this effect results from the approach people take in the explanation or imagination task: They temporarily assume that the hypothesis is true and assess how plausibly it can account… 
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