Explaining U.S. Military Strategy in Vietnam: Thinking Clearly about Causation

@article{Caverley2010ExplainingUM,
  title={Explaining U.S. Military Strategy in Vietnam: Thinking Clearly about Causation},
  author={Jonathan D. Caverley},
  journal={International Security},
  year={2010},
  volume={35},
  pages={124-143}
}
Cost distribution theory suggests that the costs to the median voter in a democracy of fighting an insurgency with firepower are relatively low compared to a more labor-intensive approach. Therefore, this voter will favor a capitalintensive counterinsurgency campaign despite the resulting diminished prospects of victory. Primary and secondary sources show that President Lyndon Johnson and his civilian aides were very much aware that, although they considered a main forcefocused and firepower… 
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