Expertise , Structure , and Reputation of Corporate Boards

@inproceedings{Levit2011ExpertiseS,
  title={Expertise , Structure , and Reputation of Corporate Boards},
  author={Doron Levit},
  year={2011}
}
This paper studies the implications of directors’s expertise for optimal board structure. The expertise of directors is particularly important when the company’s management does not cooperate with the board, and directors must rely on their own judgment when making decisions. The results of this paper demonstrate that even when the board acts in its shareholders’best interests, its expertise can harm shareholders’value by discouraging an opportunistic management from collecting and sharing… CONTINUE READING

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