Experimental Side Channel Analysis of BB84 QKD Source

  title={Experimental Side Channel Analysis of BB84 QKD Source},
  author={Ayan Kumar Biswas and Anindya Banerji and Pooja Chandravanshi and Rupesh Kumar and Ravindra Pratap Singh},
  journal={IEEE Journal of Quantum Electronics},
A typical implementation of BB84 protocol for quantum communication uses four laser diodes for transmitting weak coherent pulses, which may not have the same characteristics. We have characterized these lasers for mismatch in various parameters such as spectral width, pulse width, spatial mode, peak wavelength, polarization and their arrival times at the receiver. This information is utilized to calculate possible information leakage through side channel attacks by evaluating mutual information… 

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