Experimental Philosophy of Explanation Rising: The Case for a Plurality of Concepts of Explanation

  title={Experimental Philosophy of Explanation Rising: The Case for a Plurality of Concepts of Explanation},
  author={Matteo Colombo},
  journal={Cognitive science},
  volume={41 2},
  • M. Colombo
  • Published 2017
  • Philosophy, Medicine, Computer Science
  • Cognitive science
This paper brings together results from the philosophy and the psychology of explanation to argue that there are multiple concepts of explanation in human psychology. Specifically, it is shown that pluralism about explanation coheres with the multiplicity of models of explanation available in the philosophy of science, and it is supported by evidence from the psychology of explanatory judgment. Focusing on the case of a norm of explanatory power, the paper concludes by responding to the worry… Expand
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