Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference

@article{Deutsch2009ExperimentalPA,
  title={Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference},
  author={Max Deutsch},
  journal={Mind \& Language},
  year={2009},
  volume={24},
  pages={445-466}
}
  • Max Deutsch
  • Published 1 September 2009
  • Philosophy
  • Mind & Language
It is argued on a variety of grounds that recent results in 'experimental philosophy of language', which appear to show that there are significant cross-cultural differences in intuitions about the reference of proper names, do not pose a threat to a more traditional mode of philosophizing about reference. Some of these same grounds justify a complaint about experimental philosophy as a whole. 

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