Exit rights open complex pathways to cooperation

  title={Exit rights open complex pathways to cooperation},
  author={Chen Shen and Marko Jusup and Lei Shi and Zhen Wang and Matja{\vz} Perc and Petter Holme},
  journal={Journal of the Royal Society Interface},
  • Chen Shen, M. Jusup, +3 authors P. Holme
  • Published 2021
  • Biology, Physics, Economics, Medicine
  • Journal of the Royal Society Interface
We study the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which cooperators and defectors interact with another actor type called exiters. Rather than being exploited by defectors, exiters exit the game in favour of a small pay-off. We find that this simple extension of the game allows cooperation to flourish in well-mixed populations when iterations or reputation are added. In networked populations, however, the exit option is less conducive to cooperation. Instead, it enables the… Expand
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