Corpus ID: 203589366

Executive Market Segmentation : How Local Density Affects Incentive and Performance

@inproceedings{Zhao2015ExecutiveMS,
  title={Executive Market Segmentation : How Local Density Affects Incentive and Performance},
  author={H. Zhao and W. P. Carey},
  year={2015}
}

H. Zhao, W. P. Carey

Published 2015

This paper studies how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and firm performance. I show that executive markets are locally segmented rather than nationally integrated, and the density of a local market provides executives with noncompensation incentives. In a denser market, executives face stronger performance-based dismissal threats as well as better outside promotion opportunities. These incentives induce executives to bring higher performance to firms in… CONTINUE READING

wpcarey.asu.edu

Save to Library

Create Alert

Cite

Launch Research Feed