Executive Condence and New CEO Selection

@inproceedings{Banerjee2014ExecutiveCA,
  title={Executive Condence and New CEO Selection},
  author={Suman Banerjee and Lili Dai and Mark L. Humphery-Jenner and Vikram Nanda},
  year={2014}
}
Does a senior-executive’s confidence-level affect the likelihood of being promoted to CEO? Prior literature suggests CEOs tend to be overconfident and that, in certain situations, overconfidence can enhance firm-performance. Using an option-based overconfidence-measure, we show overconfident-senior-executives are more likely to be promoted. Firms that are candidates for a change in strategy (i.e., mature, low-risk firms) tend to appoint overconfidentexecutives and benefit in terms of improved… Expand
View via Publisher
business.adelaide.edu.au
1 Citations
Background Citations
1

One Citation

Citation Type

Citation Type

Director Overconfidence
We examine overconfident CEO directors and find they attend more board meetings, are more likely to serve on the nominating or the compensation committee, have more independent directorships, and… Expand

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 49 REFERENCES
Overconfidence, CEO Selection, and Corporate Governance
We develop a model that shows that an overconfident manager, who sometimes makes value-destroying investments, has a higher likelihood than a rational manager of being deliberately promoted to CEO… Expand
CEO Optimism and Forced Turnover
We show theoretically that optimism can lead a risk-averse Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to choose the first-best investment level that maximizes shareholder value. Optimism below (above) the… Expand
A Rationale for Hiring Irrationally Overconfident Managers
The viability of managerial overconfidence is perplexing since it has been shown to lead managers to erroneous and costly decisions. This paper addresses this issue by exploring the impact of… Expand
CEO Overconfidence and Dividend Policy
We develop a model of the dynamic interaction between CEO overconfidence and dividend policy. The model shows that an overconfident CEO views external financing as costly and hence builds financial… Expand
CEO turnover and outside succession A cross-sectional analysis
Abstract This study examines chief executive officer (CEO) turnover. It reports new evidence on factors that affect the likelihoods of voluntary and forced turnover, and for both of these turnover… Expand
Overconfidence and Early-Life Experiences: The Impact of Managerial Traits on Corporate Financial Policies
We show that measurable managerial characteristics have significant explanatory power for corporate financing decisions beyond traditional capital-structure determinants. First, managers who believe… Expand
Do Strong Boards and Trading in Their Own Firm's Stock Help CEOs Make Better Decisions? Evidence from Corporate Acquisitions by Overconfident CEOs.
Little evidence exists on whether boards help managers make better decisions. We provide evidence that strong and independent boards help overconfident CEOs avoid honest mistakes when they seek to… Expand
Can Strong Boards and Trading Their Own Firm’s Stock Help CEOs Make Better Decisions? Evidence from Acquisitions by Overconfident CEOs
Abstract Little evidence exists on whether boards help managers make better decisions. We provide evidence that strong and independent boards help overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) avoid… Expand
Overconfidence, corporate governance, and global CEO turnover
Abstract Purpose To determine what role overconfidence plays in the forced removal of CEOs internationally. Design/Methodology The study makes use of the Fortune Global 500 list. … Expand
What Happens to CEOs After They Retire? New Evidence on Career Concerns, Horizon Problems, and CEO Incentives
This paper provides evidence on a previously unidentified source of managerial incentives: concerns about post-retirement board service. Both the likelihood that a retired CEO serves on his own board… Expand
...
1
2
3
4
5
...