Exclusive Versus Non-Exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard

@article{Schmitz2007ExclusiveVN,
  title={Exclusive Versus Non-Exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard},
  author={P. Schmitz},
  journal={IO: Productivity},
  year={2007}
}
  • P. Schmitz
  • Published 2007
  • Economics
  • IO: Productivity
  • An upstream firm can license its innovation to downstream firms that have to exert further development effort. There are situations in which more licenses are sold if effort is a hidden action. Moral hazard may thus increase the probability that the product will be developed. 
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