Exclusive Versus Non-Exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard

  title={Exclusive Versus Non-Exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard},
  author={Patrick W. Schmitz},
  journal={IO: Productivity},
  • P. Schmitz
  • Published 1 March 2007
  • Economics
  • IO: Productivity

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