Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives

@inproceedings{Stanford2006ExceedingOG,
  title={Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives},
  author={P. Kyle Stanford},
  year={2006}
}
The incredible achievements of modern scientific theories lead most of us to embrace scientific realism: the view that our best theories offer us at least roughly accurate descriptions of otherwise inaccessible parts of the world like genes, atoms, and the big bang. In Exceeding Our Grasp, Stanford argues that careful attention to the history of scientific investigation invites a challenge to this view that is not well represented in contemporary debates about the nature of the scientific… 

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