Corpus ID: 192620969

Ex post bidding and efficient coordination

  title={Ex post bidding and efficient coordination},
  author={John Kennes Sydney},
  • John Kennes Sydney
  • Published 2016
  • Art
  • We study the implementation of constrained-efficient allocations in labour markets where a basic coordination problem leads to an equilibrium matching friction. We argue that these allocations can be achieved in a non-cooperative equilibrium if wages are determined by ex post bidding. This holds true even in finite-sized markets where the equilibrium-matching process has decreasing returns to scale - where the 'Hosios rule' does not apply - both with and without heterogeneity. JEL… CONTINUE READING


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