Ex-ante Regulation, Ex-post Regulation, and Collusion

@inproceedings{Hosoe2020ExanteRE,
  title={Ex-ante Regulation, Ex-post Regulation, and Collusion},
  author={Moriki Hosoe},
  year={2020}
}
So far the prevalent administrative methods in Japan have been called a preventivism or ex-ante regulation system. This is an administrative method under which the regulatory authority regulates ex-ante the related business world in charge so as not to do unfair behaviours or do “over-competition”. It is contrary to ex-post regulation with rigorous penalty system for rule-breakers and the clearness of regulation rule. In this paper we investigate the comparative analysis of ex-ante regulation… 

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