Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on the network with punishment and opportunistic partner switching

@article{Takesue2017EvolutionaryPD,
  title={Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on the network with punishment and opportunistic partner switching},
  author={Hirofumi Takesue},
  journal={Europhysics Letters},
  year={2017},
  volume={121}
}
  • H. Takesue
  • Published 17 December 2017
  • Psychology
  • Europhysics Letters
Punishment and partner switching are two well-studied mechanisms that support the evolution of cooperation. Observation of human behaviour suggests that the extent to which punishment is adopted depends on the usage of alternative mechanisms, including partner switching. In this study, we investigate the combined effect of punishment and partner switching in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games conducted on a network. In the model, agents are located on the network and participate in the… 
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