Evolutionary game theory and multi-agent reinforcement learning

  title={Evolutionary game theory and multi-agent reinforcement learning},
  author={Karl Tuyls and Ann Now{\'e}},
  journal={The Knowledge Engineering Review},
  pages={63 - 90}
  • K. Tuyls, A. Nowé
  • Published 1 March 2005
  • Computer Science
  • The Knowledge Engineering Review
In this paper we survey the basics of reinforcement learning and (evolutionary) game theory, applied to the field of multi-agent systems. [] Key Method Next we summarize the most important aspects of evolutionary game theory. Finally, we discuss the state-of-the-art of multi-agent reinforcement learning and the mathematical connection with evolutionary game theory.
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