Evolutionary economics goes mainstream: A review of the theory of learning in games

@article{Friedman1998EvolutionaryEG,
  title={Evolutionary economics goes mainstream: A review of the theory of learning in games},
  author={Daniel Friedman},
  journal={Journal of Evolutionary Economics},
  year={1998},
  volume={8},
  pages={423-432}
}
  • D. Friedman
  • Published 1 December 1998
  • Economics
  • Journal of Evolutionary Economics
Abstract. The Theory of Learning in Games by Fudenberg and Levine surveys a key branch of evolutionary economics from a mainstream perspective. Its publication provides an opportunity to reassess the prospects and goals for evolutionary economics. 
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