Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations with zealots

@article{Nakajima2015EvolutionaryDI,
  title={Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations with zealots},
  author={Yohei Nakajima and Naoki Masuda},
  journal={Journal of Mathematical Biology},
  year={2015},
  volume={70},
  pages={465 - 484}
}
We investigate evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy matrix games with zealots in finite populations. Zealots are assumed to take either strategy regardless of the fitness. When the strategy selected by the zealots is the same, the fixation of the strategy selected by the zealots is a trivial outcome. We study fixation time in this scenario. We show that the fixation time is divided into three main regimes, in one of which the fixation time is short, and in the other two the fixation time is… 

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