Evolutionary considerations in the framing of social norms

@inproceedings{Skyrms2010EvolutionaryCI,
  title={Evolutionary considerations in the framing of social norms},
  author={Brian Skyrms and Kevin J. S. Zollman},
  year={2010}
}
In this article, we aim to illustrate evolutionary explanations for the emergence of framing effects, discussed in detail in Cristina Bicchieri’s The Grammar of Society . We show how framing effects might evolve which coalesce two economically distinct interactions into a single one, leading to apparently irrational behavior in each individual interaction. Here we consider the now well-known example of the ultimatum game, and show how this ‘irrational’ behavior might result from a single… CONTINUE READING

Tables from this paper.

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
SHOWING 1-10 OF 15 REFERENCES

“ Learning Across Games ” Working Paper

  • F. Mengel
  • 2008
VIEW 1 EXCERPT

Learning Across Games

VIEW 2 EXCERPTS

“ The Evolution of Ethnocentrism ”

  • R. Axelrod, R. A. Hammond
  • Journal of Conflict Resolution
  • 2006

“ On the Origin of Convention : Evidence from Coordination Games

  • J. B. Van Huyck, R. C. Battalio, F. W. Rankin
  • Economic Journal
  • 1997