Evolutionary Psychology Versus Fodor: Arguments For and Against the Massive Modularity Hypothesis

  title={Evolutionary Psychology Versus Fodor: Arguments For and Against the Massive Modularity Hypothesis},
  author={Willem E. Frankenhuis and Annemie Ploeger},
  journal={Philosophical Psychology},
  pages={687 - 710}
Evolutionary psychologists tend to view the mind as a large collection of evolved, functionally specialized mechanisms, or modules. Cosmides and Tooby (1994) have presented four arguments in favor of this model of the mind: the engineering argument, the error argument, the poverty of the stimulus argument, and combinatorial explosion. Fodor (2000) has discussed each of these four arguments and rejected them all. In the present paper, we present and discuss the arguments for and against the… 

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