Evolutionary Psychology: The Burdens of Proof

  title={Evolutionary Psychology: The Burdens of Proof},
  author={Elisabeth A. Lloyd},
  journal={Biology and Philosophy},
  • E. Lloyd
  • Published 1 April 1999
  • Psychology, Biology
  • Biology and Philosophy
I discuss two types of evidential problems with the most widely touted experiments in evolutionary psychology, those performed by Leda Cosmides and interpreted by Cosmides and John Tooby. First, and despite Cosmides and Tooby's claims to the contrary, these experiments don't fulfil the standards of evidence of evolutionary biology. Second Cosmides and Tooby claim to have performed a crucial experiment, and to have eliminated rival approaches. Though they claim that their results are consistent… 

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