Evolutionary Equilibrium Analysis for Decision on Block Size in Blockchain Systems

@inproceedings{Chen2021EvolutionaryEA,
  title={Evolutionary Equilibrium Analysis for Decision on Block Size in Blockchain Systems},
  author={Jinmian Chen and Yukun Cheng and Zhiqi Xu and Yan Cao},
  booktitle={International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications},
  year={2021}
}
In a PoW-based blockchain network, mining pools (the solo miner could be regarded as a mining pool containing one miner) compete to successfully mine blocks to pursue rewards. Generally, the rewards include the fixed block subsidies and time-varying transaction fees. The transaction fees are offered by the senders whose transactions are packaged into blocks and is increasing with the block size. However, the larger size of a block brings the longer latency, resulting in a smaller probability of… 
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