• Corpus ID: 252090308

Evolutionary Dynamics Within and Among Competing Groups

  title={Evolutionary Dynamics Within and Among Competing Groups},
  author={Daniel B. Cooney and Simon A. Levin and Yoichiro Mori and Joshua B. Plotkin},
Biological and social systems are structured at multiple scales, and the incentives of individuals who interact in a group may diverge from the collective incentive of the group as a whole. Mechanisms to resolve this tension are responsible for profound transitions in evolutionary history, including the origin of cellular life, multi-cellular life, and even societies. Here we synthesize a growing literature that extends evolutionary game theory to describe multilevel evolutionary dynamics… 

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