Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics

  title={Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics},
  author={Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker},
  journal={Bellman Prize in Mathematical Biosciences},
  • P. TaylorL. Jonker
  • Published 1 July 1978
  • Mathematics, Economics
  • Bellman Prize in Mathematical Biosciences

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