Transition matrix model for evolutionary game dynamics.
- MathematicsPhysical review. E
An evolutionary game model based on a transition matrix approach, in which the total change in the proportion of a population playing a given strategy is summed directly over contributions from all other strategies, which yields an endemic population playing non-Nash-equilibrium strategies.
Stable Population Games and Integrability for Evolutionary Dynamics∗
We introduce a new class of population games called stable games. These games are characterized by self-defeating externalities: when agents revise their strategies, the improvements in the payoffs…
Stability of evolutionarily stable strategies in discrete replicator dynamics with time delay.
- Economics, MathematicsJournal of theoretical biology
ESS, population games, replicator dynamics: dynamics and games if not dynamic games
- Economics, Mathematics
We review some classical definitions and results concerning Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (E.S.S.) with special emphasis on their link to Wardrop equilibrium, and on the nonlinear case where the…
Evolutionary Game Theory and Evolutionary Stability
- Economics, Biology
This article discusses generalizations of evolutionary game theory, ESS, and evolutionary stability to several other classes of games, including symmetric population games where payoffs to pure strategies are nonlinear functions of the current population state as well as asymmetric games where players are assigned different roles.
Evolutionary game dynamics
Evolutionary game dynamics is the application of population dynamical methods to game theory. It has been introduced by evolutionary biologists, anticipated in part by classical game theorists. In…
Population dynamics with a stable efficient equilibrium.
- EconomicsJournal of theoretical biology
- Economics2007 46th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
It is proved that the set of Nash equilibria of any stable game is convex and globally asymptotically stable under various classes of evolutionary dynamics, classes that include the best response dynamic, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamic, and the Smith dynamic.
SHOWING 1-5 OF 5 REFERENCES
Game theory and evolution
- EconomicsAdvances in Applied Probability
Maynard Smith and Price (1973) have shown that the methods and terminology of Game Theory can be used to study the evolution of various strategies in animal species. They write a ij as the mean…
The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts.
- PsychologyJournal of theoretical biology
The Logic of Animal Conflict
Game theory and computer simulation analyses show, however, that a “limited war” strategy benefits individual animals as well as the species.
Game theory and evolution, Advances in Appl