Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics

@article{Taylor1978EvolutionarilySS,
  title={Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics},
  author={Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker},
  journal={Bellman Prize in Mathematical Biosciences},
  year={1978},
  volume={40},
  pages={145-156}
}
  • P. Taylor, L. Jonker
  • Published 1 July 1978
  • Mathematics
  • Bellman Prize in Mathematical Biosciences
We consider a class of matrix games in which successful strategies are rewarded by high reproductive rates, so become more likely to participate in subsequent playings of the game. Thus, over time, the strategy mix should evolve to some type of optimal or stable state. Maynard Smith and Price (1973) have introduced the concept of ESS (evolutionarily stable strategy) to describe a stable state of the game. We attempt to model the dynamics of the game both in the continuous case, with a system of… Expand

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