Evolutionarily Stable (Mis)specifications: Theory and Applications

@article{He2021EvolutionarilyS,
  title={Evolutionarily Stable (Mis)specifications: Theory and Applications},
  author={Kevin He and Jonathan Libgober},
  journal={Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation},
  year={2021}
}
  • Kevin He, Jonathan Libgober
  • Published 30 December 2020
  • Economics
  • Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
We introduce an evolutionary framework to evaluate competing (mis)specifications in strategic situations, focusing on which misspecifications can persist over a correct specification. Agents with heterogeneous specifications coexist in a society and repeatedly match against random opponents to play a stage game. They draw Bayesian inferences about the environment based on personal experience, so their learning depends on the distribution of specifications and matching assortativity in the… 

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