Evolution of social behavior in finite populations: a payoff transformation in general n-player games and its implications.

@article{Kurokawa2013EvolutionOS,
  title={Evolution of social behavior in finite populations: a payoff transformation in general n-player games and its implications.},
  author={Shun Kurokawa and Yasuo Ihara},
  journal={Theoretical population biology},
  year={2013},
  volume={84},
  pages={1-8}
}
The evolution of social behavior has been the focus of many theoretical investigations, which typically have assumed infinite populations and specific payoff structures. This paper explores the evolution of social behavior in a finite population using a general n-player game. First, we classify social behaviors in a group of n individuals based on their effects on the actor's and the social partner's payoffs, showing that in general such classification is possible only for a given composition… CONTINUE READING

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