Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring

  title={Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring},
  author={Martin A. Nowak and Karl Sigmund},
Darwinian evolution has to provide an explanation for cooperative behaviour. Theories of cooperation are based on kin selection (dependent on genetic relatedness),, group selection and reciprocal altruism. The idea of reciprocal altruism usually involves direct reciprocity: repeated encounters between the same individuals allow for the return of an altruistic act by the recipient. Here we present a new theoretical framework, which is based on indirect reciprocity and does not require the same… Expand

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