Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring

@article{Nowak1998EvolutionOI,
  title={Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring},
  author={Martin A. Nowak and Karl Sigmund},
  journal={Nature},
  year={1998},
  volume={393},
  pages={573-577}
}
Darwinian evolution has to provide an explanation for cooperative behaviour. Theories of cooperation are based on kin selection (dependent on genetic relatedness),, group selection and reciprocal altruism. The idea of reciprocal altruism usually involves direct reciprocity: repeated encounters between the same individuals allow for the return of an altruistic act by the recipient. Here we present a new theoretical framework, which is based on indirect reciprocity and does not require the same… 

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A computational model of cooperation in which individuals repeat playing the prisoner’s dilemma game by selecting a strategy based on their behavioral predisposition concerning the four forms reciprocity, and the predispositions evolve according to the game results found that a high level of cooperation was achieved only when the population evolved to be dominated by direct reciprocity or dominated by indirect reciprocity.

From reciprocity to unconditional altruism through signalling benefits

It is demonstrated that unconditional altruism can evolve as a costly signal of individual quality as a consequence of reciprocal altruism, and signalling benefits of altruistic acts can establish a stable generosity by high–quality individuals that no longer depends on the probability of future reciprocation or punishment.

Correlated pay-offs are key to cooperation

It is found that neither the cognitive requirements of reciprocal cooperation nor the often sequential nature of interactions are insuperable stumbling blocks for the evolution of reciprocity.

Altruism may arise from individual selection.

Indirect reciprocity is sensitive to costs of information transfer

It is shown that natural selection never favors indirect reciprocal cooperation in the presence of the cost of reputation building, regardless of thecost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation or moral assessment rules (social norms).
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