Evolution of indirect reciprocity

  title={Evolution of indirect reciprocity},
  author={Martin A. Nowak and Karl Sigmund},
Natural selection is conventionally assumed to favour the strong and selfish who maximize their own resources at the expense of others. But many biological systems, and especially human societies, are organized around altruistic, cooperative interactions. How can natural selection promote unselfish behaviour? Various mechanisms have been proposed, and a rich analysis of indirect reciprocity has recently emerged: I help you and somebody else helps me. The evolution of cooperation by indirect… 

Moral assessment in indirect reciprocity

  • K. Sigmund
  • Economics
    Journal of theoretical biology
  • 2012

Heterogeneous indirect reciprocity promotes the evolution of cooperation in structured populations.

The results of individual heterogeneity corroborate the existing evidence that heterogeneity, almost irrespective of its origin, promotes cooperative actions and might provide additional insights into understanding the roots of cooperation in social systems.

Reciprocity and Altruism

Indirect reciprocity, defined as a beneficial act whose return comes from someone other than the act's recipient, is a common phenomenon in human societies. However, it is a poorly analyzed

Evolution of reciprocal altruism by copying observed behaviour

It is shown that in populations where individuals repeatedly interact within small groups, copying facilitates the evolution of cooperation even if the individuals do not take into account who is interacting.

Darwin and the Evolution of Human Cooperation

This chapter offers an overview of different approaches to this topic (such as kin selection, group selection, direct and indirect reciprocity) and relates it to some of the views that Darwin expressed over 150 years ago.

Human cooperation

Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation

Five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation are discussed: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocities, network reciprocation, group selection, and group selection.

Social Closure and the Evolution of Cooperation via Indirect Reciprocity

This work explores the conditions under which different types of reciprocity gain dominance and their performances in sustaining cooperation in the PD played on simple networks, and shows that indirect reciprocity relying on social capital inherent in closed triads is the best competitor among them.

Evolution of Cooperation

The evolution of cooperation is a long-standing problem that has baffled biologists and sociologists alike. The problem is that not cooperating often allows for a higher immediate benefit, so why



Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring

It is proposed that the emergence of indirect reciprocity was a decisive step for the evolution of human societies and the probability of knowing the ‘image’ of the recipient must exceed the cost-to-benefit ratio of the altruistic act.

Evolution of cooperation by generalized reciprocity

It is demonstrated that if individuals repeatedly interact within small groups with different partners in a two person Prisoner's Dilemma, cooperation can emerge and also be maintained in the absence of such cognitive capabilities.

The nature of human altruism

Current gene-based evolutionary theories cannot explain important patterns of human altruism, pointing towards the importance of both theories of cultural evolution as well as gene–culture co-evolution.

The dynamics of indirect reciprocity.

A model of a model of indirect reciprocity based on image scoring is considered and conditions for the stability of altruism which differ from Hamilton's rule by simply replacing relatedness with acquaintanceship are obtained.

Donors to charity gain in both indirect reciprocity and political reputation

It is shown experimentally that donations made in public to a well–known relief organization resulted both in increased income and enhanced political reputation and may function as an honest signal for one's social reliability.

The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism

  • R. Trivers
  • Psychology
    The Quarterly Review of Biology
  • 1971
A model is presented to account for the natural selection of what is termed reciprocally altruistic behavior. The model shows how selection can operate against the cheater (non-reciprocator) in the

Heterogeneity stabilizes reciprocal altruism interactions.

Multitype analysis shows that non-idealized populations possess an ESS profile wherein individuals who cannot afford reciprocity defect, while individuals who derive net benefits from reciprocity (high-quality) cooperate, and this cooperation is implemented via unmodified tit-for-tat (TfT) strategy.