Evolution of emotions on networks leads to the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas

@article{Szolnoki2013EvolutionOE,
  title={Evolution of emotions on networks leads to the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas},
  author={Attila Szolnoki and Neng-gang Xie and Ye Ye and Matja{\vz} Perc},
  journal={Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics},
  year={2013},
  volume={87 4},
  pages={
          042805
        }
}
  • A. Szolnoki, Neng-gang Xie, +1 author M. Perc
  • Published 28 March 2013
  • Psychology, Physics, Computer Science, Biology, Medicine
  • Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics
We show that the resolution of social dilemmas in random graphs and scale-free networks is facilitated by imitating not the strategy of better-performing players but, rather, their emotions. We assume sympathy and envy to be the two emotions that determine the strategy of each player in any given interaction, and we define them as the probabilities of cooperating with players having a lower and a higher payoff, respectively. Starting with a population where all possible combinations of the two… 
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