Evolution of cooperation without reciprocity

  title={Evolution of cooperation without reciprocity},
  author={Rick L. Riolo and Michael D. Cohen and Robert Axelrod},
A long-standing problem in biological and social sciences is to understand the conditions required for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in evolving populations. For many situations, kin selection is an adequate explanation, although kin-recognition may still be a problem. Explanations of cooperation between non-kin include continuing interactions that provide a shadow of the future (that is, the expectation of an ongoing relationship) that can sustain reciprocity, possibly supported… 
Evolution of contingent altruism when cooperation is expensive.
The evolution of cooperation and altruism – a general framework and a classification of models
A synthetic conceptual framework is developed that delineates the conditions necessary for the evolution of altruism and cooperation and classifies them into four general categories.
Strong reciprocity, social structure, and the evolution of cooperative behavior
ion results have broad applicability, ranging from colonies of social amoebae or ants to corporations or nations interacting in markets and policy arenas. In all of these cases, actors in a system
Symmetry-based reciprocity: evolutionary constraints on a proximate mechanism
It is provisionally suggested symmetry-based reciprocity is to be abandoned as a possible proximate mechanism underlying the ability of animals to reciprocate cooperative interactions.
Title : The Evolution of Cooperation
Three general models by which cooperation can evolve and be maintained are distinguished: directed reciprocation, shared genes–cooperation with relatives, and byproduct benefits –cooperation as an incidental consequence of selfish action.
Tag-Mediated Altruism is Contingent on How Cheaters Are Defined
It is found that the level of altruism that evolves in a population is highly contingent on how cheaters are defined, and models of tag-mediated altruism using stronger types of cheaters may require additional mechanisms, such as punishment strategies or multi-level selection, to evolve meaningful levels of altruistan.
The option to leave: conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation.
Oscillatory dynamics in the coevolution of cooperation and mobility.
The Evolution of Cooperation
Three general models by which cooperation can evolve and be maintained are distinguished: directed reciprocation—cooperation with individuals who give in return; shared genes— cooperation with relatives (e.g., kin selection); and byproduct benefits —cooperation as an incidental consequence of selfish action.


Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
It is proposed that the emergence of indirect reciprocity was a decisive step for the evolution of human societies and the probability of knowing the ‘image’ of the recipient must exceed the cost-to-benefit ratio of the altruistic act.
The evolution of cooperation.
A model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game to show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established.
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
  • R. Trivers
  • Psychology
    The Quarterly Review of Biology
  • 1971
A model is presented to account for the natural selection of what is termed reciprocally altruistic behavior. The model shows how selection can operate against the cheater (non-reciprocator) in the
The Emergence of Social Organization in the Prisoner's Dilemma: How Context-Preservation and Other Factors Promote Cooperation
Results of agent-based simulation experiments in which the basic activity of the agents is to play the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma are reported, which support a generalized view of "neighborhood" where the important factor is the degree to which the interaction processes lead to context preservation, independent of any particular topology.
The process through which structured interaction in a population creates a `shadow of the adaptive future', allowing even a small set of cooperative strategies to grow into a cooperative regime, a coherent, self-sustaining entity that is something more than the sum of the pairwise interactions among its members is shown.
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I.
The biology of moral systems
The author argues that the ultimate interests of humans are reproductive, and that the concept of morality has arisen within groups because of its contribution to unity in the context, ultimately, of success in intergroup competition.
Evolutionary games and spatial chaos
MUCH attention has been given to the Prisoners' Dilemma as a metaphor for the problems surrounding the evolution of coopera-tive behaviour1–6. This work has dealt with the relative merits of various