Evolution of cooperation in spatially structured populations

@article{Brauchli1999EvolutionOC,
  title={Evolution of cooperation in spatially structured populations},
  author={Brauchli and Killingback and Doebeli},
  journal={Journal of theoretical biology},
  year={1999},
  volume={200 4},
  pages={
          405-17
        }
}
Using a spatial lattice model of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma we studied the evolution of cooperation within the strategy space of all stochastic strategies with a memory of one round. Comparing the spatial model with a randomly mixed model showed that (1) there is more cooperative behaviour in a spatially structured population, (2) PAVLOV and generous variants of it are very successful strategies in the spatial context and (3) in spatially structured populations evolution is much less… 

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