Corpus ID: 201058353

Evolution of cooperation in networks: well-connected cooperators can enhance cooperation but are counteracted by Trojan horses.

  title={Evolution of cooperation in networks: well-connected cooperators can enhance cooperation but are counteracted by Trojan horses.},
  author={Josefine Bohr Brask and Jonatan Bohr Brask},
  journal={arXiv: Populations and Evolution},
Cooperative behaviour is widespread in nature, but explaining how cooperation evolves constitutes a major scientific challenge. Simulation models has shown that social network structure plays a key role in rendering cooperation evolutionarily stable. However, not much is known about the importance of initial conditions for the evolution of cooperation in networks. Knowledge about this is essential for judging to which extent results from modelling and experiments can tell us something about the… Expand

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