Evolution of cooperation driven by zealots

  title={Evolution of cooperation driven by zealots},
  author={Naoki Masuda},
  journal={Scientific Reports},
  • N. Masuda
  • Published 11 July 2012
  • Economics
  • Scientific Reports
Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak. I propose an evolutionary dynamics model that links these experimental findings and evolution of cooperation. By assuming a small fraction of (imperfect) zealous cooperators, I show that a large fraction of cooperation emerges in evolutionary dynamics of social… 
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