Evolution of Beliefs and the Nash Equilibrium of Normal Form Games *

  title={Evolution of Beliefs and the Nash Equilibrium of Normal Form Games *},
  author={Masaki Aoyagi},
In models of learning, it is recognized that the path of play displays some conspicuous patterns when players use simple rules in assessing their opponents' behavior. If the players themselves become aware of such patterns, they may want to utilize them in an attempt to better assess their opponents' behavior. This paper formulates a simple two-person model of learning that allows such pattern recognition and discusses its implications. In particular, it focuses on the convergence of players… CONTINUE READING
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