Evolution and stability of altruist strategies in microbial games.

  title={Evolution and stability of altruist strategies in microbial games.},
  author={Christoph Adami and Jory Schossau and Arend Hintze},
  journal={Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics},
  volume={85 1 Pt 1},
  • Christoph Adami, Jory Schossau, Arend Hintze
  • Published 2012
  • Computer Science, Medicine, Biology, Physics
  • Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics
  • When microbes compete for limited resources, they often engage in chemical warfare using bacterial toxins. This competition can be understood in terms of evolutionary game theory (EGT). We study the predictions of EGT for the bacterial "suicide bomber" game in terms of the phase portraits of population dynamics, for parameter combinations that cover all interesting games for two-players, and seven of the 38 possible phase portraits of the three-player game. We compare these predictions to… CONTINUE READING
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