Evidentialism and the problem of stored beliefs

  title={Evidentialism and the problem of stored beliefs},
  author={Tommaso Piazza},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  • T. Piazza
  • Published 1 August 2009
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophical Studies
Many stored beliefs, like beliefs in one’s personal data or beliefs in one’s area of expertise, intuitively amount to knowledge, and so are justified. This uncontroversial datum arguably tells against evidentialism, the position according to which a belief is justified if it fits the available evidence: stored beliefs are normally not sustained by one’s available evidence. Conee and Feldman have tried to meet this potential objection by relaxing the notion of available evidence. According to… 
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2004, with a Forward, 83–107)
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  • 2001
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Internalism expoused
  • The Journal of Philosophy
  • 1999
Internalism defended
  • 2001