Evidence Enriched

  title={Evidence Enriched},
  author={Nora Mills Boyd},
  journal={Philosophy of Science},
  pages={403 - 421}
  • N. Boyd
  • Published 1 July 2018
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophy of Science
Traditionally, empiricism has relied on the specialness of human observation, yet science is rife with sophisticated instrumentation and techniques. The present article advances a conception of empirical evidence applicable to actual scientific practice. I argue that this conception elucidates how the results of scientific research can be repurposed across diverse epistemic contexts: it helps to make sense of how evidence accumulates across theory change, how different evidence can be… 

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