Everyone lived in fear: Malaya and the British way of counter-insurgency

  title={Everyone lived in fear: Malaya and the British way of counter-insurgency},
  author={Karl Hack},
  journal={Small Wars \& Insurgencies},
  pages={671 - 699}
  • K. Hack
  • Published 2012
  • Sociology
  • Small Wars & Insurgencies
Recent research on Palestine, Kenya, and Malaya has emphasised the coercive nature of ‘Britain's dirty wars’. Abuses have been detailed and a self-congratulatory Cold War-era account of British counter-insurgency – as ‘winning hearts and minds’ and using minimum force – subjected to intensifying attack. The result has been a swing from over-sanitised narratives of the primacy of ‘winning hearts and minds’, towards revisionist accounts of relentless coercion, the narrowly coercive role of the… Expand
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