Events as Property Exemplifications

  title={Events as Property Exemplifications},
  author={Jaegwon Kim},
The term ‘event’ ordinarily implies a change, and most changes are changes in a substance. Whether coming into being and passing away can be construed as changes in substances is a question we shall not consider here. A change in a substance occurs when that substance acquires a property it did not previously have, or loses a property it previously had. Whether fissions and fusions of substances can be considered as cases of losing or acquiring properties is, again, a question we shall not… 
Vague objects and phenomenal wholes
We consider the so-called problem of the many, formulated by Peter Unger. It arises because ordinary material things do not have precise boundaries: it is always possible to find borderline parts of
Causality and Properties
It is events, rather then objects or properties, that are usually taken by philosophers to be the terms of the causal relationship. But an event typically consists of a change in the properties or
Events, their names, and their synchronic structure
We present in this paper a novel ontological theory of events whose central tenet is the Aristotelian distinction between the object that changes and the actual subject of change, which is what we
Events, Truth, and Indeterminacy
will be true or false according to whether Lou’s lecture (an event) is boring or not. Davidson (1967) and many others have argued that this distinction is central to the way we talk about the world,
Do Events Have Their Parts Essentially?
We argue that mereological essentialism for events is independent of mereological essentialism for objects, and that the philosophical fallout of embracing mereological essentialism for events is
What is a Change?
According to Aristotle a change, metabole, is from something to something else. He distinguishes three kinds of changes. One of them is what he calls motionkinesisi.e., the transition from a positive
Objects and Events: an Investigation into their Identification
John goes out for a walk. If John endures and his walk perdures, they are different entities. However, what if both John and his walk perdure? Is John’s walk identical to his relevant temporal part?
Are Events Things of the Past?
A popular claim in recent philosophy of mind and action is that events only exist once they are over. This has been taken to have the consequence that many temporal phenomena cannot be understood
Why are Events, Facts, and States of Affairs Different?
Abstract This article claims that events, facts and states of affairs need to be differentiated. It takes as a starting point Chisholm’s (1976) claim that only his ontology of states of affairs
The Recycling Problem for Event Individuation
If the wedding had taken place an hour later, it would have been rained out. When we make counterfactual claims like this, we indicate that events are not terribly fragile things. That is, we


On When There Must Be a Time-Difference between Cause and Effect
Building on two nonproblematic claims, I argue for a qualified endorsement of Hume's intuition that there must be a time-difference between cause and effect. Those claims are: (i) that the statement
On event-identity