Evaluating Strategic Forecasters

@inproceedings{Deb2017EvaluatingSF,
  title={Evaluating Strategic Forecasters},
  author={Rahul Deb and Mallesh M. Pai and Maher Said},
  year={2017}
}
Motivated by the question of how one should evaluate professional election forecasters, we study a novel dynamic mechanism design problem without transfers. A principal who wishes to hire only high-quality forecasters is faced with an agent of unknown quality. The agent privately observes signals about a publicly observable future event, and may strategically misrepresent information to inflate the principal’s perception of his quality. We show that the optimal deterministic mechanism is simple… CONTINUE READING

From This Paper

Topics from this paper.

Citations

Publications citing this paper.

Dynamic Delegation : Specialization and Favoritism ∗

Daniel Fershtman
2017
View 10 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-9 of 9 references

Dynamic Mechanisms without Money,

Y GUO
AND J. HÖRNER • 2017

SØRENSEN (2006a): “Professional Advice,

M. OTTAVIANI, N P.
Journal of Economic Theory, • 2006

Deterministic Mechanisms and the Revelation Principle,

R. STRAUSZ
Economics Letters, • 2003

Sequential Screening,

P. 117–136. COURTY, LI H.
Review of Economic Studies, • 2000

Analyst Forecasts and Herding Behavior,

B. TRUEMAN
Review of Financial Studies, • 1994
View 1 Excerpt

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…