Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong

@inproceedings{Mackie1977EthicsIR,
  title={Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong},
  author={J. L. Mackie},
  year={1977}
}
  • J. Mackie
  • Published 17 November 1977
  • Philosophy
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