Errors in Learning from Others' Choices

  title={Errors in Learning from Others' Choices},
  author={Mohsen Foroughifar},
  journal={PSN: Social Choice \& Welfare (Topic)},
Observation of other people's choices can provide useful information in many circumstances. However, individuals may not utilize this information efficiently, i.e., they may make decision-making errors in social interactions. In this paper, I use a simple and transparent experimental setting to identify these errors. In a within-subject design, I first show that subjects exhibit a higher level of irrationality in the presence than in the absence of social interaction, even when they receive… Expand


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